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1. Introduction
It is well recognized that financial variables such as cash flow and cash
stocks are robust and quantitatively important explanatory variables for
investment in reduced-form equations estimated with firm-level data.
Following the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), a
large body of recent empirical work attributes these findings to capital-
market imperfections [see the extensive survey by Hubbard (1998)]. This
literature argues that when access to external debt and equity is costly,
internally available funds provide a cheaper source of financing, thus
increasing the desired level of investment. Such cost premiums for exter-
nal finance are generally explained by appealing to models with asym-
metric information and agency problems.
Despite the volume of empirical work in this literature, financing-
based interpretations of the explanatory power of cash flow and other
financial variables in investment equations remain controversial.
1 Even
among economists who agree that firms face some degree of financial
frictions, there remains substantial disagreement over the magnitude of
such frictions and whether they are large enough to affect investment
behavior. The controversy can be traced to two distinct but related prob-
lems with identification. The first problem is that financial variables may
contain information about future returns to capital. In a forward-looking
We thank Charles Calomiris, Russel Cooper, Jan Eberly, Bernd Fitzenberger, Bill Gentry,
Mark Gertler, Bob Hodrick, Glenn Hubbard, Cornelia Kullman, Chris Mayer, John Shea,
and Kristen Willard for helpful comments and suggestions and the NSF for financial
support. We are especially grateful for excellent comments from Ben Bernanke, David
Gross, Julio Rotemberg, and Ken West. We are also grateful to seminar participants at
Boston University, the CEPR/DFG/ZEW Conference on Industrial Structure and Input Mar-
kets, Columbia, CREST, Georgetown, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and the 1998 NBER Macro Annual Conference.
1. See, for example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
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model, investment depends on marginal Q, the present value of ex-
pected future marginal returns to capital. This present value is the "fun-
damental" to which investment should respond, even in the absence of
capital-market imperfections. Any variable that helps predict marginal Q
should appear as a state variable in the firm's decision rule for invest-
ment, and should therefore have explanatory power for investment. The
ratio of cash flow to capital is obviously closely related to the return on
capital, so from the perspective of models based on forward-looking
fundamentals, if other variables in the regression (like Tobin's Q) do not
fully specify the expected marginal value of capital, it is not surprising
that cash flow appears in reduced-form regression models. The same
logic makes it difficult to interpret the role of other financial variables
such as cash stocks and leverage as well.
The second identification problem relates to the distinction between
the marginal return to capital and the average return to capital. In the
absence of financial-market imperfections, the present value of expected
future marginal profitability of capital (MPK) should be the sole determi-
nant of investment at the firm level. Lacking good measures of the
marginal return to capital, the empirical investment literature often re-
lies on the average return to capital—the ratio of profits to capital—as a
proxy for the marginal return. Unfortunately, this proxy also provides a
good measure of the financial health of the firm, which, in the presence
of financial-market imperfections, should also influence investment. By
not carefully distinguishing between the present value of marginal and
average returns, the existing empirical investment literature potentially
confounds the influence of investment fundamentals with the effect of
financial factors that reflect premiums on external finance.
In Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), we attempted to resolve the first
of these identification problems by using a vector autoregression to
model the forward-looking role of cash flow in a structural model for
investment. Using firm-level data, we confirmed that the predictive
power of cash flow for future MPK in a model with perfect capital mar-
kets could account for a significant portion of the overall explanatory
power of cash flow for investment. But we also found evidence against
the model. Like previous studies that used Tobin's Q to control for the
expected return to investment, we found that investment is "excessively
sensitive" to cash flow, that is, more sensitive to cash flow than the
neoclassical model of investment information would predict. We con-
cluded that financial-market imperfections were a likely source of the
model's rejection, but our modeling framework was not sufficiently gen-
eral to assign a structural interpretation to investment's excess sensitiv-
ity to cash flow.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 225
In this paper, we attempt to resolve the second identification problem
by extending the empirical framework used in our previous work to a
(linearized) structural model of investment that explicitly incorporates
financial frictions. Like our previous work, this empirical framework
uses panel-data vector autoregressions (VARs) to construct expectations
of the future marginal profitability of capital. Unlike our previous work,
however, we introduce financial frictions into the model, and we de-
velop improved measures of the marginal profitability of capital (MPK)
that sharpen the distinction between MPK and financial factors. By com-
bining better measures of MPK with our extended model, we substan-
tially improve our ability to identify and quantify the influence of finan-
cial factors on investment decisions.
Although panel-data VARs have not been widely used by previous
researchers to describe investment behavior, we believe they can be a
useful tool for summarizing the data and testing structural model as-
sumptions.
2 We consider two strategies for using VARs to model invest-
ment. First, we use VARs to summarize the dynamic relationship among
investment, MPK, and cash flow. By imposing a recursive structure on
the contemporaneous shocks of the model (a standard identification
technique in VAR analysis), we identify shocks to cash flow that are
orthogonal to MPK. The impulse response functions for this model
show that the orthogonalized shocks to cash flow elicit a substantial and
prolonged response from investment. Moreover, the cash-flow shock
predicts either zero or negative response to MPK. This result implies that
the response of investment to cash flow cannot be attributed to revisions
in the expected return to capital. Indeed, the negative response of MPK
implies (counterfactually) that investment should fall rather than rise in
response to the cash-flow shock. This evidence is difficult to reconcile
with a model in which cash flow's influence on investment is entirely
attributable to nonfinancial fundamentals.
Our second strategy uses panel-data VARs to impose structural restric-
tions on the investment equation derived from a model with costly exter-
nal finance. The use of VARs to estimate structural investment models
was introduced into the empirical investment literature by Abel and
Blanchard (1986), and was subsequently applied to panel data by
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). The modeling contribution in this pa-
per is to show that putting financial frictions in the model introduces a
state-dependent discount factor that depends on the firm's balance-
sheet condition. Because it is not possible to solve this model analyti-
2. The two applications of panel-data VARs to firm-level investment of which we are aware
are Whited (1992) and Himmelberg (1990).226 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
cally, we work with a linearized version that is amenable to VAR meth-
ods. This structure allows us to identify the sensitivity of investment to
changes in the expected marginal value of capital. With financial fric-
tions in the model, we show that investment should also display excess
sensitivity to the present value of financial variables because these vari-
ables influence the future shadow cost of funds used to discount future
MPK.
In our empirical results, we find that investment is responsive to both
fundamental and financial factors, as predicted by the existence of fi-
nancial frictions. This response is both statistically and economically
significant—for the average firm in our sample, our estimates show that
financial factors increase the overall response of investment to an expan-
sionary shock by 25% over the first few years following the initial impulse.
Although the average firm in our sample shows a quantitatively signifi-
cant response to financial factors, we also find that financial factors play
little, if any, role in determining the investment behavior of bond-rated
firms. Because bond-rated firms account for a large fraction of overall
investment activity (on the order of 50% in manufacturing), this reduces
the role of financial factors for aggregate investment, at least during
normal times. While non-bond-rated firms are quantitatively less impor-
tant for aggregate investment, they are more labor-intensive and are
influential in the determination of inventory dynamics.
3 To the extent
that non-bond-rated firms rely on external funds to finance both labor
inputs and inventory investment, our evidence that such firms do in-
deed face capital market imperfections suggests that financial factors will
have important influences through these channels as well.
4
2. Investment, MPK, and Cash Flow:
Simple VAR Evidence
In this section we begin by discussing the importance of measuring MPK
as accurately as possible. We then briefly discuss the estimation of panel-
data vector autoregressions and argue the merits of using VARs as sum-
mary statistics that provide a full, dynamic description of the relationship
among investment, MPK, and financial variables. Finally, we suggest a
recursive ordering of the VAR that allows us to identify the component of
cash-flow innovations that is orthogonal to the MPK shock. We report
3. See Carpenter, Fazzari, and Peterson (1997).
4. Sharpe (1993) shows the importance of financial constraints for employment dynamics.
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Carpenter, Fazzari, and Peterson (1997), and Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) provide evidence for inventory dynamics, and Himmelberg and
Peterson (1994) estimate the effect of financial frictions on R&D spending.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 227
impulse response functions for investment based on this ordering, and
argue that the results provide evidence of a financing role for cash flow.
These results motivate a more structural econometric investigation,
which we provide in Section 3.
2.1 MEASURING MPK




where A is the total factor productivity, y is output, k and n are quasifixed
capital stocks, and x is a variable factor input. We allow for nonconstant
returns to scale by assuming ak + an + ax = 1 + y, where y is the return-
to-scale parameter. We allow for multiple quasifixed factors because we
are concerned about the empirical implications of ignoring omitted
quasifixed factors. The idea here is that k represents the stock of fixed
property, plant, and equipment, while n represents R&D capital and
other intangible assets. The assumption of a single variable input is
without loss of generality. Assuming that the firm faces an inverse de-
mand curve p(y), variable factor prices w, and fixed costs F, the profit
function is defined by
77 (k, n, w, F) = max p(y)y — wx — F
x>0
s.t. y = Ak^n^x™. (2.1)
This specification of the profit function allows fixed costs F to be time-
varying. For example, if n represents the stock of the firm's R&D work-
ers, which are quasifixed factors due to hiring and firing costs, the F
could represent the wages paid to these workers.
By applying the envelope theorem, the marginal profitability of fixed
capital, denoted by MPK, is readily shown to be
(2.2)
where 0 = (1 + T}'
1) ak> 17 = (dy/dp)p/y < -1 is the (firm-level) price
elasticity of demand,
5 ak is the capital share of output from the Cobb-
Douglas specification, and s = py is the firm's sales. Equation (2.2) shows
that, up to a scale parameter,
6 the ratio of sales to capital measures the
5. Note that if firms are profit maximizers, they will produce on the elastic portion of the
demand curve, so that 17 < — 1.
6. If the effect of corporate taxes is included, then the tax-adjusted expression for MPK
takes the form MPK = (1 — T)Q(s/k), where ris the corporate tax rate on profits. Our
estimates of 6 allow variation in rover industries but not over time. Time variation in tax
rates would, to some degree, be captured by our year dummies. We plan to explore the




























































































marginal profitability of fixed capital.
7
Because it is unreasonable to assume that manufacturing firms in dif-
ferent industries face the same price elasticity of demand, 17, or the same
capital share of sales, ak, we construct industry-level estimates of 6. We
assume that firms are, on average, at their equilibrium capital stocks.
Ignoring adjustment costs, this says the marginal profitability of capital
should roughtly equal the cost of capital, that is, MPK,, = rit + 8it, where
rit and Sit are the risk-adjusted discount rate and depreciation rate of
capital, respectively. Substituting 6j(s/k)it for MPK,, and averaging over all
firms i G I(j) and years t G T(i) in industry;' suggests that a reasonable
estimate of 0; is given by
M 22
where N; is the number of firm-year observations for industry j. In prac-
tice, we assume that (I/NT) 2,e/(,)2teT(o (rjt + 8it) = 0.18 for all industries.
8
To show the degree to which 6 varies across two-digit industries,
columns 3 and 7 in Table 1 report the values of 0;. The table shows that
the value of 0, ranges from .017 to 0.097. The assumptions ak = 0.06 and
r] — -4.0 imply a value of (1 + rf
l)ak = 0.045. These values seem
7. This derivation ignores the difference between production and sales. For the smaller
subset of firms in Compustat that report finished goods, the correlation between
production-to-capital ratio and sales-to-capital ratio exceeds 0.99. In light of this fact and
because of the limited availability of data on finished goods, we opted to measure MPK
using the sales-to-capital ratio.
8. We experimented with different values for (l/NT)2iEZ(/) 2ter(.) (r1( + 8it), including the calculation of industry-specific depreciation rates. In practice, this adds very little varia-
tion to the estimated value of 9jf but this is probably an issue that future work could
profitably explore in more depth.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 229
plausible, suggesting that our estimates of 0; reported in Table 1 are
reasonable. We therefore construct estimates of the marginal profit using
In the results reported in the paper, this is our preferred measure of
MPK, which we refer to as MPK1. The summary statistics reported in
Table 2 indicate that MPK1 has a mean of 0.200, with an interquartile
range of 0.121 to 0.240.
2.2 WHY IT IS LESS DESIRABLE TO MEASURE MPK USING
OPERATING INCOME
Previous authors have measured MPK using the ratio of operating in-
come to capital. For example, using aggregate data for U.S. manufactur-




Acronym Definition (S.D.) Min 25% 50% 75% Max
MPK1 Sales-based marginal profit- 0.200 0.019 0.121 0.170 0.241 1.37
ability of capital (see text) (0.125)
MPK2 Operating-income-based 0.164 -0.410 0.090 0.1521 0.241 2.04
marginal profitability of capi- (0.131)
tal (see text)
S/K Sales/capital 5.03 0.518 2.86 4.27 6.21 30.4
=xnjx8(t-l) (3-36)
OI/K (Operating income)/capital 0.467 -1.23 0.237 0.419 0.637 3.86
=xMt-l) (0.392)
CF/K (Cash flow)/capital 0.291 -0.976 0.148 0.274 0.427 2.44
=(*18 + xu)/x8(t-l) (0.291)
I/K (Gross investment)/capital 0.227 0.013 0.119 0.185 0.280 1.56
=X3Ofr8(t-l) (0.175)
CE/K (Cash and equivalents)/ 0.271 0.00 0.045 0.129 0.344 4.13
capital
=x,As(t-l) (0.372)
FW/K (Financial working capital)/ 0.218 -1.00 -0.092 0.122 0.441 2.98
capital
= (x,-x5+x3)/Xfl(t-l) (0.548)
TD/K (Total debt)/capital 1.01 0.001 0.481 0.764 1.27 7.64
=(*34 + x9)/xa(t-l) (0.825)
TQ Tobin'sQ 1.47 0.170 0.972 1.17 1.48 12.0
+ 10x19 + xm)/x6 (0.955)
The notation x^q refers to Compustat data item 99, etc.230 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
ing, Abel and Blanchard (1986) used the average profitability of capital to
measure MPK. In Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), we constructed a
similar measure with firm-level data by using the ratio of operating
income to capital. In hindsight, we think the assumptions necessary to
make this approximation—zero fixed costs and perfect competition—
are unreasonable at the firm level.
9 The sales-based measure described in
the previous section is our preferred measure, for reasons which we
explain in this section.
Working from the firm's objective function in equation (2.1), an alterna-
tive representation of the marginal profit is
d7T / 77 F ,PV \
— = <p ~ + - + T7 — , (2.3)
dk \ k k k I
where <p = ak/(ak + an - y).
1
0 With accounting data, we observe ir/k and
py/k, but not F. Hence, to use equation (2.3), we must assume fixed costs
are zero, so that F = 0. Moreover, 17 and <p cannot be separately identified
without access to additional data, so it is also necessary to at least as-
sume that TJ"
1 is constant across industries; more conventionally, perfect
competition is assumed, so that 17"
1 = 0. Under these assumptions, a
measure of MPK based on operating income is given by
Just as we used industry estimates of 0; to adjust the sales-to-capital ratio,
we implement equation (2.4) using industry estimates of the capital share
of variable profits, <p;. Thus, a second measure of MPK is given by
9. In defense of Abel and Blanchard (1986), one advantage of using aggregate data is the
availability of prices and wages, which make it possible to construct variable costs. At
the firm level, however, only total costs are available, so variable costs are unmeasur-
able unless we assume fixed costs are zero.
10. The derivation of equation (2.3) follows from the first-order condition for variable
inputs, (1 + ri~
l)ajjy = wx. The returns-to-scale parameter 7 is defined so that the
factor shares sum to 1 + y, i.e., ax + ak + an = 1 + y, so that constant returns would imply y = 0. Substituting for ax in the first-order condition and rearranging, we find (1
+ rj~
l)(ak + an - y)py = (1 + rf
l)py - wx. Using TT + F = py - wx, this can be written
Dividing both sides by k gives the desired result. Note that if y = 0, then <p = ak/(ak +
an) is simply the capital share of quasifixed inputs.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 231
where oi,, denotes operating income.
It is important to stress that for our purposes, MPK2 is less desirable
than MPK1. This is because the accuracy of MPK2 requires the added
assumptions of zero fixed costs and perfect competition, whereas MPK1
does not. In other words, MPK2 is a noisier measure of MPK. But the
most important shortcoming of MPK2 is that the noise component is
correlated with cash flow, and thus MPK2 could spuriously attribute
cash-flow fluctuations to changes in MPK. This distinction is obviously
important, because MPK is what matters for fundamental explanations,
whereas cash flow is more likely to matter for financial reasons. The
empirical results in this paper exploit this difference.
2.3 MEASURING CASH FLOW
Our accounting definition of cash flow is net income before extraordi-
nary items plus depreciation. Equivalently, cash flow is operating in-
come before depreciation and minus taxes, minus interest payments,
plus nonoperating income, plus special items. To provide a feel for rela-
tive magnitudes, Table 3 reports the aggregate income sheet for the
Compustat universe of manufacturing firms in 1988.
With respect to the terms in Equation (2.3), py corresponds to sales,
while wx + F corresponds to cost of goods sold plus selling, general, and
administrative expenses. It is therefore not possible with accounting
data to disentangle variable and fixed costs. This is one of the reasons we
gave in the previous section for preferring MPK1 over MPK2.
In equation 2.3, the difference between marginal and average profits
introduced scope for identifying changes in cash flow distinct from
changes in MPK. Our definition of cash flow provides additional sources
of independent variation from MPK, because it treats taxes payable and
Table 3 AGGREGATE INCOME STATEMENT IN 1988 (PERCENTAGE OF
SALES)
Sales
-Cost of goods sold 67.6
—Selling, general, and administrative expenses 17.6
Operating income before depreciation 14.9
-taxes payable 3.6
—interest payments 2.2
+(-) Nonoperating income 1.8
+(—) Special items 0.0
Cash flow 10.9
—depreciation 5.0
Net income before extraordinary items 5.9232 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
interest payments as fixed charges.
1
1 In addition, as the table shows,
many firms generate internal funds from financial investments and
other nonoperating assets. These funds provide a third source of cash-
flow variation, which is distinct from MPK variation.
Our definition of cash flow is only partly correlated with operating
income, which in turn is only partly correlated with MPK. This is
an important empirical distinction which previous authors (including
Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) have failed to exploit. We exploit this
difference below to distinguish the investment response to pure cash-
flow shocks from the response to mere MPK shocks.
2.4 PANEL-DATA VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS
It is uncommon to see VARs estimated with panel data, and VARs have
not been widely used in the investment literature, so we provide a brief
discussion of the (minimal) econometric assumptions for their estima-
tion with panel data. Without loss of generality, consider the following
VAR(l) with fixed firm effects and year effects:
Va = fyn-\ +fi + dt + uit,
where A is a k X k matrix of slope coefficients, _/• is a k X 1 vector of
(unobserved) firm effects, and dt is k X 1 vector of year effects (to be
estimated). In this paper, yit will generally consist of a k X 1 vector of
firm-level state variables and decision variables that will include vari-
ables like investment, MPK, and cash flow. More generally, this notation
will be used to describe the companion form of a VAR(p) model for yit. In
either case, the matrix of parameters A is redefined accordingly.
A VAR model provides a surprisingly flexible framework for describ-
ing the dynamic relationship among firm-level panel data. For one, the
inclusion of the time effects dt accommodates aggregate shocks to yit that
are common across firms. Thus, to the extent that there may be common
movements to interest rates or other macroeconomic conditions that are
not captured by lagged yit, these factors will be captured by time dum-
mies. In addition, under the assumption that E(uit) = 0 and E(uitu'jt) = 12,
(and conditional on {dt}J=l, where the dt's are parameters that will be
estimated), yit has unconditional mean and variance given by E(yit) = (I -
A)"
1/ and Var(yft) = (I - A)~
lOi(I - A)'
1. Thus, while the model imposes
the same slope coefficients A across firms, it imposes no restrictions on
the unconditional mean and variance of yit. This is an important feature
11. We do not need to assume that current interest and tax payments are strictly predeter-
mined. Rather, we only assume that to the extent they are endogenous, they are
determined by factors independently of the decision to invest.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 233
of the model, since the unconditional means and variances of most firm-
level variables display substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity.
The estimation of panel-data VARs has been discussed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), among others, and they show that
panel data pose no particular problem for the estimation of VARs. In
fact, asymptotic results are, if anything, easier to derive for panel data
than for time series. We mention this because it is still common to en-
counter confusion (usually among macroeconomists) over the feasibility
of estimating a time-series model (such as a VAR) using only a few years
of data. Because the sampling properties depend on the number of
cross-sectional observations, not the number of time-series observa-
tions, it is technically possible, for example, to estimate an AR1 on a
panel with as few as 3 years of data, although it is preferable to have
panels with 5 or more years (because this increases the availability of
instruments required for the estimation technique described below). All
that is required is that the slope coefficients be the same across observa-
tions in the cross section. Estimation does not require homogeneity of
the intercepts or the variances of the error terms. More details on the
econometrics are included in the appendix.
2.5 THE DATA
Our data set is a firm-level panel of annual data on firms drawn from the
Compustat universe of manufacturing firms from 1980 to 1993. We sam-
pled every available firm-year observation during this time period with-
out regard to whether the firm was in existence for the length of the time
period; that is, we did not require a balanced panel. We then removed
observations for which the data required to construct the variables in
Table 2 were not available. We also imposed outlier rules on the Table 2
variables by removing observations that fell below the first or above the
99th percentile. Rules of this sort are both common and necessary when
working with large panels, because some firms have very small (mea-
sured) capital stocks, and these cause large outliers when capital appears
in the denominator as a scaling variable.
1
2
12. To deal with large discrete changes in firm identity due to large mergers, acquisitions,
and divestitures, we deleted observations which had large outliers in the amount by
which the percentage change in the capital stock differed from the gross investment
rate net of depreciation. For robustness issues, when estimating structural models, we
considered financial variables that were ratios of both capital and debt. Because these
financial variables have more dispersion in the tails, the forecasting equations used in
our structural estimates were in some cases less precise without more stringent outlier
rules for these variables. We therefore imposed the additional requirements that the
ratios CE/debt and FW/Kbe within (-1,3). These rules are approximately equivalent to
trimming the tails of these variables at the 2% level.234 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
2.6 IDENTIFICATION USING RECURSIVELY ORDERED
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS
When interpreting the effect of cash flow on investment, the primary
identification problem is to distinguish the information revealed about
future MPKs from the information revealed about the financial condition
of the firm. One way to make this distinction is by using a structural
VAR, which imposes restrictions on the contemporaneous shocks but
not on the coefficients of lagged variables. In our empirical specification,
we estimate a three-variable, two-lag VAR that controls for fixed firm
and year effects. The VAR variables are I/K, the ratio of gross investment
to capital; MPK, the marginal profit of capital (based on sales as de-
scribed in the previous section); and CF/K, the ratio of cash flow to
capital. In the context of this VAR system, there are two issues that affect
the interpretation of cash flow in the investment equation as evidence of
a financing effect.
The first issue, of which the literature has long been aware, is that
even after conditioning on lagged investment and MPK, lagged cash
flow can still contain information about the future marginal profitability
of capital. In this case, the responsiveness of investment to cash flow
simply reflects the fact that we are estimating a forward-looking decision
rule, and that CF/K belongs in the information set. The second issue is
that it is difficult to identify the effects of contemporaneous cash-flow
shocks on investment. To deal with this issue, we postulate a causal
relationship among contemporaneous shocks that is obtained from a
standard Cholesky decomposition using the ordering I/K, MPK, CF/K
This ordering allows for the possibility that I/K shocks contemporane-
ously cause movements in cash flow and MPK, but assumes there is no
feedback (contemporaneously) from MPK shocks to I/K, or from cash
flow to MPK.
This ordering is particularly interesting for investigating the effect of
cash flow's financing role because orthogonal cash-flow shocks, by con-
struction, contain no information about current MPK. While this repre-
sents progress toward identifying pure cash-flow effects, it does not
confront the first issue. That is, while our orthogonal cash-flow shocks
are uncorrelated with current MPK, they may nonetheless be correlated
with future MPK. Thus, when using the impulse response functions to
interpret the dynamic response of investment to orthogonal cash-flow
shocks, it is important to inspect the dynamic response of MPK for
evidence that the cash-flow shock predicts future marginal profits.
We report the impulse response of investment to both MPK shocks
and cash-flow shocks, where the residuals are orthogonalized using theInvestment: Fundamentals and Finance • 235





























































Impulse response functions based on a two-lag VAR for investment, MPK, and cash flow. Impulse
response functions show the response to a one-standard-deviation shock.
decomposition described above. The top part of Table 4 reports the
impulse response of all three variables to the MPK shock. As expected,
investment, MPK and cash flow all rise in response to such a shock, with
the effect persisting over a two- to three-year horizon before returning
slowly to steady state.
The bottom part of Table 4 reports the response of investment to a
cash-flow shock that is orthogonal to MPK. In this case investment re-
sponds positively to cash flow (the magnitude of response here is actu-
ally slightly larger than for the MPK shock), despite the fact that the
marginal profitability of capital falls in response to such a shock. Thus,
while fundamentals are falling, investment is rising. These results sug-
gest that the positive investment response to cash flow is not caused by
the predictive content of cash flow for future investment opportunities.
Indeed, the negative response of future MPK implies that the impulse




In summary, reduced-form VAR analysis shows that investment re-
13. It is possible that, in addition to financial factors, cash flow also captures information
about cost shocks that are not reflected in our sales-based fundamental. Under the
assumption of Cobb-Douglas production, our measure of MPK captures the influence
of both cost shocks and demand shocks on the marginal profitability of capital. If there
are large deviations from Cobb-Douglas production, however, then cost shocks may
be an issue. To investigate this possibility, we augmented our VAR framework by
adding the ratio of cost of goods sold to capital (COG/K) as another variable in the VAR.
We then considered a shock to cash flow that was orthogonal to I/K, MPK, and COG/K.
We still obtain the result that investment responds positively to cash flow even though
fundamentals are falling. Indeed, the quantitative results from this exercise are very
close to those reported in Table 4. Thus, it seems unlikely that unmeasured variations
in costs are driving this result.236 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
sponds to both fundamentals (as measured by MPK) and financial fac-
tors (as measured by cash flow). The positive investment response to
cash-flow shocks cannot be attributed to rising profit opportunities us-
ing our measure of the marginal profitability of capital, and is therefore
most likely to be explained by financial frictions that generate excess
sensitivity of investment to cash-flow shocks. While these results sug-
gest that financial factors influence investment at the firm level, this
exercise is limited in its ability to provide an economic description of the
exact channel through capital-market imperfections influence invest-
ment dynamics. To say more, it is necessary to consider the more struc-
tural approach provided in the next section.
3. A Model oj Investment with financial Frictions
In this section we develop a model of investment with financial frictions
that is similar to models that have been explored in the literature. The
goal here is not to show how financial frictions can be integrated into the
standard investment model, but to show how the resulting model,
which is nonlinear, can be linearized to obtain a tractable dynamic sys-
tem of equations that describe the joint evolution of investment, MPK,
and financial variables. This framework includes the standard Q model
of investment as a special case.
Let ll(Kt,Q denote the maximized value of current profits taking as
given the beginning-of-period capital stock, Kt, and a profitability shock,
£,. For the time being, we make no assumptions regarding the nature of
returns to scale or competition in the product and factor markets, other
than to assume that the profit function is concave and bounded. The
time to build and install one unit of capital is one period,
1
4 where 8 is the
rate of capital depreciation and It is the investment expenditure, so that
the capital stock evolves according to the equation Kt+1 = (1 - 8)Kt + It.
Finally, as is common in the literature, we assume that C(It,Kt) is the
resource cost of installing It units of capital.
1
5 For simplicity, the numer-
aire is the price of capital.
14. The true time to build is probably somewhere closer to six months, for which we have
no corresponding assumption using annual data. In the absence of a strong empirical
motive, a good theoretical reason for assuming one-period time to build is that it
simplifies the inversion of the marginal adjustment cost function.
15. Future research could investigate alternative adjustment cost technologies designed to
deal with asymmetries and nonconvexities, such as those developed by Abel and
Eberly (1994, 1996) and Caballero (1997). Under one such alternative specification of
adjustment costs, Caballero and Leahy (1996) show why average Q may be theoreti-
cally more effective than marginal Q for explaining investment. Recent papers by
Goolsbee and Gross (1997) and Caballero and Engel (1998) provide empirical evidence
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A simple way to incorporate financial frictions is to assume that
the marginal source of external finance is debt, and to assume that
risk-neutral debt holders demand an external finance premium, 17, =
r](Kt/Bt/^t), which in general depends on the entire state vector of the
firm, and is increasing in the amount borrowed {dr\/dB > 0). The idea is
that highly leveraged firms have to pay an additional premium to com-
pensate debt holders for increased costs due to information problems
(e.g., ex post monitoring costs and/or moral hazard costs). While previ-
ous researchers have derived this premium in equilibrium,
1
6 it is suffi-
cient for our purposes to postulate the existence of such a function, and
to assume that this function is increasing in the debt level. Hence, we
assume that the gross required rate of return on debt is (1 + rt) [1 +
T](Kt,Bt>Q], where rt is the risk-free rate of return.
We have in mind that Bt summarizes the firm's net financial liabilities
(bank debt, trade debt, cash holdings, etc.). This is the simplest possible
model of financial assets and liabilities. In our empirical work, we con-
sider several alternative definitions of Bt, one measure being long-term
debt minus the net short-term financial assets of the firm, i.e., long-term
debt minus financial working capital. Alternative specifications of Bt and
r}(Kt/Bt/Q could be easily investigated.
1
7
To guarantee that debt (and not equity) is the firm's marginal source of
finance, we need either to assume a binding non-negativity constraint
on dividends, or to assume that equity holders prefer to have dividends
paid out rather than reinvested. One way to make this operational is to
assume a utility function for dividends (e.g. Gross, 1997). This assump-
tion is particularly useful when constructing numerical solutions to the
model, because it avoids corner solutions. For our purposes, however, it
is sufficient to display a model that generates a shadow cost of equity, and
the simplest way to this is to assume that dividends cannot be negative
(i.e., that marginal equity is prohibitively expensive).
For simplicity, assume a constant price of new capital goods, normal-
ized at unity, and let (1 + r,)"
1 be the ex ante one-period discount factor
used to value period-f + 1 dividends at time t. Then the manager's
problem is
V(Kt,Bt,Q = max Dt + Et Z 1 Kl + r^)"
1 Dt+S
U(+s,B(+s+1}=o=0 s=i \fc=i /
subject to
16. For example, Moyen (1997) derives an equilibrium debt premium generated by default
costs.
17. Future research on the underlying sources of capital-market frictions could usefully
guide future empirical work by suggesting appropriate functional forms for 77 and A.238 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
D, = 77(K,,£) - C(It,Kt) - It+ Bt+1 - (1 + r,)[l Kt+l = (1 - 8)Kt+ It,
Dt >0,
where Et is the exceptions operator conditional on the time-f information
set nt.
To see the effect of financial frictions, let A, be the Lagrange multiplier
for the non-negativity constraint on dividends. The multiplier \t indi-
cates the shadow value of paying a negative dividend, and can thus be
interpreted economically as the shadow cost of internally generated
funds. The role of this shadow cost in the firm's investment decision is
exposed by deriving the Euler equation for investment
18:
If At+1 = A, = 0 and 17, = 0, then the shadow cost of internal funds is one,
and the Euler equation is identical to the one provided by the perfect-
capital-markets model. In the presence of financial market imperfec-
tions, however, At = \(Kt,Bt/Q and 17, = r\(Kt,Bt,Q are state-dependent and time-varying.
1
9 The first-order condition for debt requires that
= 1.
The marginal cost of debt determines the shadow cost of funds today vs.
tomorrow (i.e., A( vs. Am), and hence provides a time-varying discount
factor that depends on the level of net financial liabilities, Bt (among
18. A number of papers in the literature estimate this Euler equation directly by assuming a
parametric form for the shadow cost term: Himmelberg (1990), Whited (1992), Hubbard
and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995), and Jaramillo, Schian-
terelli, and Weiss (1996).
19. While it is not necessary to resolve such issues for our empirical specification, it is
interesting to ask under what conditions the premium on external funds is likely to be
stationary. For simplicity, suppose 77(+1 doesn't depend on 0t+1, so that we can ignore the expectations operator (B(+1 and Kt+i are known at time t). Then in steady state, a constrained firm would have A, = A,+1, which implies {dr\/dB)B + 77 = 0. Since drj/dB > 0,
we would observe B > 0 only if 77 < 0. This is possible if, for example, the premium 77 is
net of tax advantages or agency benefits. That is, despite the positive marginal pre-
mium on debt, the average premium might be negative. In a more general model, a
steady-state equilibrium with di]/dB > 0 could be maintained by modeling managers as
"impatient." In Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), for example, exogenous firm
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other state variables). This point is general and does not depend in any
specific way on our particular dividend assumption.
3.1 A LINEARIZED EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Let c(It/Kt) denote the marginal adjustment cost function, and let MPK,
denote the marginal profit function net of adjustment costs and financ-
ing costs.
2
0 For simplicity, assume the discount rate rt is constant over
time and over firms (in the discussion below, we explain how this as-
sumption could easily be relaxed). Then the first-order conditions for the
above model with financial frictions can be written
s0u+sUFKt
where the discount factor has been factored into a deterministic compo-
nent, /3 = (1 — 5)/(l + r), times a stochastic component 0tt+sll
sk=l (1 + \t+k)/
(1 + \t+k-i), which in general will be a function of firm-level variables.
Since the mean of ©M+s should be near one, we can use a first-order
Taylor approximation around E(@tt+S) — 1 and £(MPKf+s) — y to write
©M+sMPKf+s - y0 + y0u+s + MPK,+S.
Furthermore, we can approximate the expression for 0tt+s to get
v ^t+k ~ K+k-
Jt=l -
1 ^ ^t+k-l
=* const + ZJ $FIN,+Jt,
k=l
where we have assumed that (Xt+k — A(+Jt_1)/(1 + \t+k-i) = </>0 + <^FIN,+Jtis a linear approximation representing the dependence of the shadow dis-
count term on a financial state variable represented by FINf+fc. This func-
tional form assumption for 0tt+s obviously allows us to specify FIN either
as net financial liabilities (i.e., Bt), in which case the predicted sign of </> is
negative, or as net financial assets (i.e., -Bt), in which case the predicted
20. In our empirical work, we ignore the marginal reduction of financing costs in our
construction of MPK because it is a small effect relative to dTI/dK.240 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
sign of <f> is positive. In our empirical work, we prefer to work with net
financial assets.
Note that with additional notation, we could have allowed the stochas-
tic component of the discount factor, ©tt+s, to include a time-varying
discount factor, rt. Then the above linearization would include an addi-
tional term capturing the effect of rt. In our empirical work, the inclusion
of time dummies in our panel-data regressions accommodates time-
varying discount rates. By the same logic, allowing for firm fixed effects
accommodates firm-specific discount rates attributable to differences in
the average firm-level "beta" as well as differences in the average level of
the firm's external finance premium.
It is useful at this point to briefly consider what would constitute a
plausible range of values of 4> for our model. One way to do this is to
consider a plausible range of variation for the premium on external
funds across firms. Letting ar represent the standard deviation of the net
external finance premium, our model suggests that ar — </>crFin. Calomiris
and Himmelberg (1998) report that the standard deviation for underwrit-
ing spreads for seasoned equity issues is 5.8%. For annual data, the
measured premium on average loan rates can easily vary by 5 percent-
age points across firms, or over time for a given firm. Thus a range of 5%
to 10% seems reasonable for the marginal premium on external funds. In
our empirical work below, we use the ratio of cash and equivalents to
capital as one measure of FIN,. This variable has a standard deviation of
0.37, implying that a ballpark figure for 4> is on the order of 0.1 to 0.3.




s ®tt+s + E*2 j8
sMPKf+s
s=l ' s=l
= const + y<j>Et2j2jp
s FINt+Jt + EtZ, j3
sMPK(+s.
S=lJt=l S=l
Estimation requires a functional form for adjustment costs. Following
standard practice, we assume that C(ItKt) is quadratic in IJKt, so that
marginal adjustment costs are linear in I/Kt. We also extend the specifica-
tion to include a technology shock (ot. Thus, the marginal adjustment
cost function is assumed to be
c(It,Kt) = const + a
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Under this specification of the adjustment cost technology, the relation-
ship between investment, the present value of future FIN,, and the
present value of future MPK, is given by
(I/K)t = const + «?</>£, E E /? FIN,+Jt + a£,2 j6
s MPK,+S + cot. (3.2)
s=lk=l s=l
The standard Q-model of investment is a special case of the above
model where </> = 0, and the model is typically estimated using Tobin's Q
as a proxy for the present value of future marginal profits, i.e., Q, =
£,2?=i /3
SMPK,+S. With financial frictions, however, Tobin's Q-values not
only future MPK, but also changes in the expected financial status of the
firm, E£%\ 2l=i j3
s FINt+k. Thus Tobin's Q would appear to be a poor
choice for estimating investment models when the goal is to identify
financial frictions.
2
1 We elaborate on this point in Section 4. As an alterna-
tive to using Tobin's Q, we propose the method used by Abel and
Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), which constructs
present-value terms by estimating a VAR for the vector of state variables
that help to forecast MPK, and FIN,.
3.2 THE EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE OF MPK AND FINANCIAL
FACTORS USING VAR FORECASTS
In our notation, we now add the subscript i to index firm-level vari-
ables. To construct this expectation using a VAR model of the firm's
state vector, let xit be a vector containing current and lagged values of
MPK,,, FIN,,, and any other variables containing information that can be
used to forecast the future marginal profitability of investment.
2
2 This
information xit_x C flt is available at time t when the firm i makes its
investment decision. We assume that these variables follow an auto-
regressive process, and to simplify notation, we write this VAR in com-
panion form as
21. Under some specifications of the external finance premium, it is possible to show that
Tobin's Q remains a sufficient statistic for investment (see Chirinko, 1993). This further
shows why Tobin's Q is a poor choice for estimating investment models when the goal
is to detect and quantify the importance of financing constraints. For further evidence
on this point, see the simulation results reported by Gomes (1997).
22. The variables included in the forecast VAR should not include lagged investment. In
theory, it is feasible and even desirable to include lagged investment in the forecast
VAR, but doing so makes it much more difficult to impose the cross-equation restric-
tions. This is a difficult methodological issue on which we are currently working and
which we hope to explore in a future paper.242 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
and we assume E(wrtlxrt_a) = 0. By recursive substitution, the conditional
expectation of xit+s given xit_x is easily seen to be
= A
s xit_v
Let MPK,, be the first element of xit, and let FIN,, be the second element. If
we let Cj denote a vector of zeros with a one in the yth position, then
MPK,, = c[xit and FIN,, = c'2xit. Using this notation, the expected present
value of MPK is given by
s=l
s=l







These present-value formulae allow us to specify a structural reduced-
form model of investment that is linear in xt:
, = const + a(PV,f
K) + «74>(PV™) +/, + dt+ o>,, (3.3)
The terms f{ and dt represent fixed firm and year effects that are con-
trolled for in the estimation. The residual satisfies the moment condition
E[o)itxit_s] = 0 for all s, so all lagged values of xH are valid for estimation.
23. Here we make use of the result that 2"=i0
s 2t-i A
k = (1 - p)~\l - fiAy^A.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 243
4. Model Implications and a Discussion of the Recent
Investment Literature on Financing Constraints
The empirical framework in the previous section shows that in a (lin-
earized) model with financial frictions, investment is a function of both
(1) the expected present value of future MPKs, or fundamental Q, and (2)
the expected present value of future financial state variables of the firm,
or financial Q. That is,
fundamental Q financial Q
Although the above equation has not been used in past research, it
nevertheless explains the intuition underlying many of the empirical
specifications in the literature surveyed by Hubbard (1998). Specifically,
it shows that investment equations based only on fundamental Q con-
tain an omitted variable in the error term, so that investment will appear
to be excessively sensitive to any explanatory variable (e.g., cash flow)
that helps to predict current or future values of FIN,. This equation also
shows that investment can be excessively sensitive even to nonfinancial
variables such as sales growth, provided such variables help to forecast
future financial conditions.
While it is easy in theory to see why investment should be excessively
sensitive to variables that are correlated with financial Q, it is difficult in
practice to assign econometric interpretations to the explanatory vari-
ables in a reduced-form regression. The interpretation of cash flow, for
example, is not obvious, because it could predict fundamental Q as well
as financial Q. By the same logic, the role of Tobin's Q is theoretically
ambiguous, because Tobin's Q measures the average value of capital,
and this is closely related to financial Q in some theoretical models. In
Gertler (1992), for example, the firm's net worth determines the degree
to which external investors can write contracts that reduce moral hazard
on the part of insiders, and thus determines the severity of financing
constraints. In his model, or in any model where the specification of the
financial friction depends on net worth, Tobin's Q will contain informa-
tion about both fundamental Q and financial Q, and will therefore be
difficult to interpret in the absence of more model structure.
2
4
24. There are additional problems in the empirical literature that are usefully viewed in the
context of the above model. First, as we argued in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995),
there are reasons to believe that Tobin's Q is a poor proxy for fundamental Q. For
example, if firms enjoy market power, or if firms employ multiple quasifixed factor
inputs, or if Tobin's Q is measured with noise, then Tobin's Q will not be a sufficient244 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
A recent paper by Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (1997) provides a
useful illustration of this problem. In their paper, the idea is to use
analysts' earnings forecasts to construct fundamental Q. They use data
obtained from IBES, which provides forecasts at one-year and two-year
horizons, ilit and f2rt, as well as forecasts of the expected annual growth
rate, git, of earnings in years 3 through 5. Assuming a discount rate j8,
they approximate the present value of earnings by assuming that earn-
ings continue to grow at the rate git for 10 years. Thus, they assume the




Defining "fundamental Q" as PVft
ARN/Kit, they regress investment on this
measure of fundamental Q and current earnings and report that invest-
ment displays no "excess sensitivity" to current earnings.
2
6 But does
pyEARN i^ measure fundamental Q or financial Q? Our model makes it
clear that identification requires two separate terms; at best, PV^
ARN/JC,f
combines these two Q-variables into one term. Indeed, PV^
ARN/K,f is
conceivably a better measure of financial Q than of fundamental Q,
statistic for fundamental Q, and investment will display excess sensitivity to any vari-
able (including financial variables) that contains forecast information for the future
marginal profitability of capital. In other words, poor proxies for fundamental Q may
spuriously give rise to excess cash-flow sensitivity and thus overstate the importance of
financial Q. For this reason, the literature has generally placed more emphasis on the
fact that cash-flow sensitivity tends to be greater for firms that are more likely to face
financial frictions on the basis of some a priori measure (such as size, dividend payout,
or access to public debt markets). Even so, the interpretation of excess cash-flow
sensitivities remains controversial. See the critique by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and
the rebuttal by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1996).
25. Strictly speaking, they do not report this equation, but this is what we infer based on
our reading of the verbal description in their paper.
26. In addition to their conceptual failure to distinguish between fundamental Q and
financial Q, we have some doubts about the robustness of their empirical results. We
have examined the IBES data ourselves, and in contrast to the claims made by Cum-
mins, Hassett, and Oliner, we do not find that the inclusion of earnings forecasts
eliminates the explanatory power of cash flow and other balance-sheet variables. We
have not yet been able to trace the sources of this discrepancy, but one possible explana-
tion may be the fact that Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner use IBES earnings per share
(EPS) and shares outstanding to construct current total earnings. This is problematic,
because the number of shares reported by IBES corresponds to the number outstand-
ing on the date of the forecast and does not correspond to the number outstanding on
the date of the fiscal year end. Stock splits and other share adjustments make this
calculation impossible. When we use Compustat cash flow and earnings measures
instead of IBES earnings, we find no evidence to suggest that earnings forecasts are
sufficient statistics for investment. In the end, however, the robustness of their results
is a red herring. Our main objection is conceptual, because the present value of earn-
ings is a good measure of financial Q.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 245
because the only difference between earnings and cash flow is deprecia-
tion, whereas it is a long way from earnings to MPK1 (see the discussion
in Section 2.1.1, and the income sheet reported in Section 2.2).
5. Empirical Results on the Structural Model
In this section of the paper we explore the extent to which investment
responds to fundamental Q versus financial Q in our structural model.
We begin our analysis using the full sample. We then look at how our
results vary across subsamples where the data are split based on indica-
tors that capture a firm's likely degree of access to finance.
The estimates of equation (3.3) described in the previous section are
constructed as follows. First, a VAR(2) is specified with the following
vector of variables: MPK1, MPK2, and the state variable FIN,-, measuring
the firm's financial status. Because MPK1 depends on sales, and MPK2
depends on operating income, the VAR system includes information on
both revenues and profits as well as financial factors. The instrument set
includes lags one and two each of the variables used in the forecasting
system. For the regressions that do not include a PDV of financial fac-
tors, we include the cash and equivalents to capital ratio in the forecast-
ing system. Second, this VAR is used to construct the fundamental Q,
PVf
K, and the financial Q, PV™ :
PV,f
K = c'2{l - '
2
PV™ = 4(i -




N using the same set of
instrumental variables as those used when estimating the VAR. All re-
gressions are run using the forward mean-differencing transformation
described in the appendix.
We consider two alternative definitions of the state variable measuring
financial Q: the ratio of cash and equivalents to capital, (CE/K),(, and the
ratio of financial working capital minus long-term debt to capital, (FW/K
- LD/K),,.
2
7 The first definition captures the short-term liquid asset posi-
tion of the firm. It thus reflects the amount of savings inside the firm. It
also reflects the share of assets that is most easily used as collateral. The
second variable measures the leverage position of the firm, net of cur-
rent liquid assets. A distinct advantage of both of these variables is that
they measure financial stocks rather than financial flows. Because finan-
27. We define "financial working capital" as current assets minus current liabilities plus






























































Adjusted standard errors in parentheses (see appendix).
cial stocks are less directly linked to the marginal profitability of capital,
their present values are more likely orthogonal to PVjf
P
K than are present




Table 5 reports estimates of parameters corresponding to a and ay</> in
equation (3.3). For comparison purposes, we report results using the
two alternative definitions of PVjf
P
K based on the two alternative mea-
sures of MPK. As described in Section 2, the first definition is based on
the ratio of sales to capital, while the second definition is based on the
ratio of operating income to capital. These results are estimated under
the assumption that the time to build is one period, and the information
set used by the firm is based on time-(f — 1) information. The first three
columns contain results using the sales-based MPK, and the last three
28. We also investigated a third specification of financial Q using cash flow, (CF/K)1(, as the
financial state variable. This specification of financial Q was a robust explanatory vari-
able in all of the specifications that we tried. Unfortunately, it was also highly correlated
with our measure of fundamental Q, just as one might have anticipated from our
theoretical discussion of MPK in Section 2.2. As a consequence of this collinearity, the
coefficient on fundamental Q in these regressions was typically insignificant and occa-
sionally even negative. We obviously do not view this as evidence that adjustment
costs are negative. Rather, we view this as evidence of model misspecification caused
by the fact that financial Q was picking up information about fundamental Q. As we
explain in the text, when we used stock measures of the firm's financial status, this was
not a problem. We consider additional theoretical work on the financial side of the
model to be an important direction for future research because this could help resolve
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columns contain results using MPK based on operating income. This
table reveals one of the major results in the paper: Fundamental Q does
very well in explaining the investment data. In particular, the coeffi-
cients on PV,^
P
K suggest rapid adjustment speeds and hence reasonable
adjustment costs.
Despite the success of the sales-based measure of fundamental Q in
explaining investment, investment is still highly responsive to financial
factors. In all cases, financial Q is an important determinant of invest-
ment. With standard errors adjusted for the fact that the present-value
terms are generated from previous regressions, the ^-statistics are on the




Besides reporting coefficient values, Table 5 also reports two diagnos-
tic statistics: the P-value from a chi-squared test of orthogonality be-
tween error terms and instruments, and the R
2 from the regression. The
orthogonality tests reject the model overwhelmingly and suggest model
misspecification, even when financial factors are included. As we show
below, this model misspecification is due to firms that are most likely to
face severe financial constraints.
We now consider the results using fundamental Q constructed from
the operating-income-based measure of MPK. In the full-sample results
(Table 5, columns 4-6), it appears to make little difference whether our
measure of MPK is based on sales or operating income. We obtain simi-
lar coefficients for adjustment costs, and approximately the same R
2. The
fact that the coefficients on fundamental Q are fairly close across both
measures suggests that we are using the correct normalizations of sales
to capital and operating income to capital ratios when constructing MPK
measures.
5.2 RESULTS BASED ON SAMPLE SPLITS
We now consider how our results vary across subsamples of firms when
the subsamples are designed to sort firms by their ability to access finan-
cial markets. The traditional argument for performing subsample splits
in the literature is that not all firms have the same degree of access to
financial markets. The response of investment by firms with costly ac-
cess is more likely to be sensitive to financial factors than that of firms
with cheap access to external financial markets. Sample splitting thus
provides a way to test for the presence of financial factors, even with
imperfect measures of investment fundamentals. For example, large
29. The standard-error correction that results from generated regressors raised the stan-
dard errors by approximately 75-100%.248 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
firms and firms that have issued public debt or have established
commercial-paper programs are likely to have established lines of credit
that may be drawn down during periods of low profitability. As a result,
the investment policy of such firms may not be responsive to swings in
balance-sheet conditions. By not taking such differences into account,
we may not obtain an accurate description of the importance of financial
factors in investment. Also, to the extent that we can identify a subset of
firms that do not face financial frictions, and for whom the baseline
investment model without financial frictions fits well, we can be more
confident that our underlying investment model is correct. Such a result
would imply that the presence of financial factors does not simply cap-
ture an undetermined source of model misspecification.
When splitting the sample, we consider three alternative criteria. The
first criterion sorts firms according to whether or not they have an S&P
bond rating. Because most firms that issue public debt obtain a bond
rating, this effectively sorts the full sample into firms that have issued
public debt in the past, versus those that have not. Calomiris, Himmel-
berg, and Wachtel (1995) argue that public-debt issuance is a good indica-
tion that a firm has low-cost access to capital markets, because firms with
serious adverse selection or moral hazard problems are forced to rely on
intermediated finance such as bank debt and private placements. Be-
cause the population of public-debt issuers is relatively stable over time,
this selection criterion has the advantage of being relatively exogenous
with respect to the time-series variation in the data. It has the disadvan-
tage of only capturing a subset of the best-quality firms.
The other two criteria that we use to split the sample are the dividend
payout ratio and firm size. The dividend payout ratio was originally
used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and has been employed
in a number of additional studies. The size split has also been used
extensively to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen 1996). The
rationale for splitting the sample according to dividend policy is that
when firms declare dividends, they endogenously reveal that they have
a low shadow value of internal funds. For a number of reasons, firm size
is another common way of identifying firms with low external-financing
premiums. For one, it is plausible that costs of obtaining funds contain a
significant fixed-cost component. The presence of such increasing re-
turns suggests that small firms face higher costs of obtaining external
funds than large firms. In addition, size is a proxy for age and other
unobservable firm attributes that affect the degree to which public infor-
mation about the firm's investment projects is available. Among publicly
traded firms, smaller, newer firms are less likely to be tracked by ana-Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 249
lysts and less likely to have been through multiple equity or debt offer-
ings that result in substantial production of public information.
While the bond-rating categorization is based on a zero-one variable
(rating versus no rating), both the dividend payout ratio and size are
continuous. Because we wish to distinguish firms with cheap access to
credit from firms that face potential credit frictions whose investment
will be responsive to financial state variables, we divide the sample
conservatively and classify firms who are in the top one-third of the
dividend payout or size distribution as likely to be unconstrained.
3
0
For each sample split, we allow the VAR forecasting system to vary
across the constrained and unconstrained subsamples. By allowing the
VAR forecasting system to vary across subsamples we correct for any
systematic differences in forecasting properties that may bias results. We
report the results using both the sales-based MPK and the operating-
income-based MPK, and consider the cash-and-equivalents variable as
our financial state variable. The regression results for this exercise are
reported in Tables 6 and 7.
The results from the sample-splitting exercise provide strong evidence
that financial factors are important determinants of investment, princi-
pally for firms classified as constrained. Table 6 reports the results for the
bond-rating split, using both the sales-based and operating-income-
based measures of MPK. Using either definition of MPK, firms with a
bond rating show no sensitivity of investment to financial factors. Thus
all of the contribution of financial factors in explaining investment comes
through firms without bond ratings. The orthogonality conditions for
the baseline investment model are not rejected for firms classified as
unconstrained. This result implies that the underlying investment model
does well at explaining the data, in the absence of financial frictions. In
addition, adding the financial factor adds very little in terms of explana-
tory power as measured by R
2 for unconstrained firms. For firms without
bond ratings, the coefficients on financial factors increase by 40% rela-
tive to the full sample results.
Table 6 also shows that, for bond-rated firms, the sales-based MPK mea-
sure does a much better job explaining investment than the operating-
income-based MPK. In particular, the coefficient on fundamental Q is
much higher and the model is not rejected when using a sales-based
30. Because we compute the 66th percentile for the dividend payout and size variables
before dropping firms because of missing values, we end up with slightly different
sample sizes than the one-third-two-thirds split of the original sample. The actual
values used are a ratio of common dividends to capital greater or less than 0.05 and real
sales greater or less than $364 million. Real sales were constructed using the GDP
deflator. This cutoff for real sales is close to the value of $250 million used by Gertler





















































































































Adjusted standard errors in parentheses (see appendix).
MPK. These findings suggest that our sales-based MPK captures most of
the information about fundamentals in the absence of credit frictions.
Table 7 reports results for alternative sample splits using the sales-
based measure of fundamentals (similar conclusions are reached using
MPK based on operating income). Small firms are clearly more respon-
sive to financial factors than large firms. For the dividend split, the
differences across subsamples are not so obvious. There is less of a
difference in estimates of $ for low- vs. high-dividend firms, once one
corrects for the fact that the coefficient estimate on fundamental Q is
much lower for high-dividend firms.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 251
5.3 GOODNESS OF FIT AND ROBUSTNESS EXERCISES
We conducted a variety of robustness exercises that are not reported in
the tables. First, we investigated the robustness of our results across
industries. While it is not possible to estimate separate investment equa-
tions for each industry, it is possible to consider a more homogeneous
sample than the full set of manufacturing firms considered above. For
robustness, we reestimated all the regressions reported in Table 5 for a
sample that is limited to durable-goods industries only (two-digit SICs
between 3200 and 3999). The argument for doing this exercise is that the
durable-goods industries are much more homogeneous than the nondu-

























































































































Adjusted standard errors in parentheses (see appendix).252 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
rabies industries. In addition, these industries may have different time-
series properties that would be better captured by their own set of time
dummies. If so, the forecasting equations obtained from the VAR may
perform better. This exercise provides very similar results to those ob-
tained in Table 5. For the durables subsample, fundamental Q provides
considerable explanatory power for investment and reasonable esti-
mates of adjustment costs. Nonetheless, present values of financial state
variables are still important determinants of investment, in both eco-
nomic and statistical terms.
The second exercise we perform is to check for robustness by exclud-
ing the smallest firms in the sample. Because size and bond rating are
correlated, it is useful to know if the results based on sample splits are
purely a size effect, generated by the smallest firms in the sample. For a
variety of reasons, such firms may respond differently to both fundamen-
tal Q and financial Q. To examine this issue, we reconsidered the bond-
rating splits after dropping all firms with total assets less than $100
million in real terms (1992 dollars). As one would expect, the financial
effect is somewhat weaker when one drops the small firms. We nonethe-
less still find substantial differences in response between non-bond-
rated and bond-rated firms, with bond-rated firms showing no response
to financial Q, and non-bond-rated firms showing an economically and
statistically significant response. This finding implies that while size is
important, it is nonetheless the case that some medium-size firms do not
have perfect access to debt and equity markets, and these account for an
important component of the overall degree of excess sensitivity mea-
sured in the data.
The final exercise we consider is to include lagged investment in the
empirical specification. The convex adjustment cost structure developed
in this paper suggests that only the fundamentals and financial variables
should explain investment and that lagged investment should not mat-
ter. Empirically, however, lagged investment may matter for three rea-
sons. First, the adjustment cost structure could be richer than what we
have modeled. If this is the case, the model may exhibit more inertia
than one would expect absent such misspecification. Second, it is possi-
ble that investment itself helps forecast the future fundamentals and/or
financial factors, in which case our present value constructs would be
measured with an error that is correlated with lagged I/K Finally, it is
possible that the model is well specified but that shocks exhibit serial
correlation, in which case the presence of lagged investment would
reveal such correlation.
Our empirical results uniformly reject the hypothesis that lagged in-
vestment does not matter for current investment, even after controllingInvestment: Fundamentals and Finance • 253
for both fundamentals and financial factors. The coefficient on lagged
investment is on the order of 0.1-0.2 and highly significant. While this
result suggests model misspecification, it is also the case that including
lagged investment has little effect on the estimated parameter values




To further investigate the role of lagged investment, we estimated a
VAR forecasting system that included investment as one of the system
variables. With this specification, lagged investment is then explicitly
included in our construction of present-value forecasts. Without impos-
ing model consistency between the forecasting system and the empirical
specification of the structural investment equation, we re-estimated the
investment equation, allowing lagged investment to enter freely on the
right-hand side. Other than raising the coefficient on lagged investment
somewhat, this exercise produced little change in any of the coefficient
estimates, implying that investment's ability to forecast future MPK and
financial variables does not explain the presence of lagged investment.
In future work, it would be useful to further investigate the role of
alternative explanations like richer adjustment costs and serially corre-
lated shocks. Finally, it is worth noting that lagged investment is a signifi-
cant explanatory variable in more standard Q regressions as well. Thus,
this form of model misspecification does not result from our particularly
empirical specification, but is instead endemic to a wide variety of empiri-
cal specifications of investment equations.
3
2
5.4 THE EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL FACTORS
Having estimated the basic model, and having considered a variety of
robustness issues, we now use the structural coefficients to gauge the
likely empirical contribution of the financial factors to investment. We do
this by shocking the VAR used to construct the forecast and tracing out
the time path for both fundamental Q and financial Q. To obtain the time
path of investment, we feed these two Q-values into the investment
31. To be more precise, omitting lagged investment from both the regressors and the
instruments produced very similar coefficients to regressions that include lagged invest-
ment as both a regressor and instrument. The main difference in results is that the
coefficients on both fundamental and financial terms rise somewhat to offset the inertia
introduced by lagged investment in the empirical specification. As a result, the dy-
namic responses of the models look very similar, whether or not one includes lagged V
K on the right-hand side.
32. While this is especially true of panel data, it also tends to be true for aggregate data as
well (see Abel and Blanchard (1986) for example). Kiyotaki and West (1996) provide a
notable counterexample with their empirical model of investment using aggregate
postwar Japanese data. In particular, they attribute all of the explanatory power of
lagged investment to its ability to predict future fundamentals.254 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG




































Excess response (%) 0.245 0.261 0.275 0.288 0.299 0.308
specification using the parameter values reported in column 2 of Table
5.
3
3 To gauge the contribution of financial factors, we do this exercise
both with and without financial Q. The results are reported in Table 8.
A one-standard deviation shock raises MPK1 by 0.046 units. The ratio
of cash and equivalents to capital increases by slightly more than 0.04
units as balance sheets are strengthened in the wake of the expansionary
shock. The response of fundamental Q implies an increase in the invest-
ment rate next period of 0.033. Adding in the contribution of financial Q
raises the overall response of investment to 0.041. Thus in the first
period, financial Q adds an additional 25% to the baseline response
obtained from shutting down movements in the present value of cash
and equivalents. In the next few periods, we also obtain 25-30% magnifi-
cation. Thus, the financial effect has a substantial contribution to the
overall investment response of the average firm.
Using a combination of the coefficient estimates and the impulse re-
sponse to financial Q, we can compute the implied response to the one-
period return that generated the additional movement in investment
relative to the baseline model. With /3 = 0.8,y = 0.2, and an estimate of
a around unity, our estimate of (f> is approximately O.2.
3
4 In the initial
period, financial Q rises by approximately 0.04. This implies that the
one-period return rose by 80 basis points in the first period, before
slowly returning to steady state. Given the fact that the average postwar
spread between the prime rate and T-bill is 2%, and bank loans are often
quoted at 1-2% above or below prime depending on credit quality, this
strikes us as a moderate response for the premium on external funds.
33. The model with lagged investment produces similar results.
34. This estimate is very much in line with our ballpark figures of 0.1-0.3 discussed above.Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 255
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that by combining careful measurement of MPK
with structural VAR methods, it is possible to improve on existing meth-
ods for identifying the financing role of cash flow and other financial
variables in reduced-form investment equations. We examine two strate-
gies for imposing structure on VARs to identify the effect of financial
factors on investment.
In our first strategy, we use a recursive ordering to structure the con-
temporaneous relationship among shocks in the VAR. This allows us to
identify shocks to cash flow that are orthogonal to current MPK. Such
shocks elicit a sustained response from investment over a three-year
period. Such shocks also predict a fall in future MPK, suggesting that
cash flow matters above and beyond its ability to predict investment
fundamentals. Because the future response of MPK to an orthogonal
cash-flow shock is negative, the investment response likely understates
the effect that cash flow has on investment via lower financing costs.
In our second strategy, we estimate a linearized version of a structural
model of investment that embeds financial frictions. This structural
framework shows that investment depends not only on the present
value of the future marginal profitability of capital (MPK), which we call
"fundamental Q," but also on the present value of future shadow values
of internal funds, which we call "financial Q." In contrast to previous
work on financing constraints using firm-level panel data, we first explic-
itly relate these shadow values to observable financial state variables and
then use VARs to construct the present-value terms corresponding to
both fundamental Q and financial Q.
Our empirical results using the structural model show that for a wide
variety of specification choices, investment is responsive to both funda-
mental Q and financial Q. We argue that the values of the estimated
structural parameters are reasonable on a priori grounds, and that the
estimated effect of financial factors on investment is quantitatively sig-
nificant. For the average firm in our sample, financial factors amplify the
overall investment response to an expansionary shock by 25%, relative
to a baseline model where such effects are shut down. Consistent with
the theory underlying financial-market imperfections, small firms and
firms without bond ratings show the strangest response to financial
factors, while bond-rated firms show little if any response. Because
bond-rated firms account for 50% of aggregate manufacturing invest-
ment, our results suggest that the overall amplification of manufacturing
investment is somewhat less than 25%.256 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
Appendix
This appendix briefly describes the econometrics used in the paper.
First, it describes our approach to estimating panel-data VARs, and sec-
ond, it describes the adjusted standard-error calculations required by
our two-step procedure for estimating the structural parameters of the
investment equation. Our approach to estimating panel-data VARs fol-
low Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991),
Keane and Runkle (1992), and Arellano and Bover (1995), among others,
which consider the treatment of fixed firm effects in the presence of
predetermined but not strictly exogenous explanatory variables. Our
treatment of the generated regressor problem introduced by our two-
step estimation technique follows Newey (1984).
A.I ESTIMATING VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS USING
PANEL DATA
Let yj, = {yl, . . . , yft Y be an M X 1 vector of variables observed in panel
data, where i indexes cross-section observations and t indexes time-
series observations. Then the mth equation of a P-lag VAR can be written
as
yS = x'itb
m + a7+y? + i%,
where xit = {y[t.v . . . , y'it-pY is an MP X 1 vector of lagged endogenous variables (the same for each equation of the VAR), If is an MP X 1 vector
of slope coefficients, af is a fixed firm effect, *ff is an aggregate shock
(time dummy), and U™ is an idiosyncratic shock satisfying
"/ tf/***«-i/*ft-* • • •) = 0.
This conditional moment implies E(x'itu™+^ = 0 for all s > 0. If the model
did not include fixed firm and year effects, we could use OLS to obtain
estimates of b
m for all m. However, the presence of unobserved fixed
effects (which, by virtue of the lagged dependent variable, are correlated
with xit) requires panel-data techniques for obtaining consistent esti-
mates of If". To deal with fixed year effects is trivial; we can either esti-
mate dummy variables or, more simply, transform the above model
again to deviations from year-specific means. In the exposition below,
we assume that y™ and xit have already been transformed to remove year
effects.
To remove the fixed effects af, we transform the model to deviations
from forward means. Let y
md and xit denote the means constructed fromInvestment: Fundamentals and Finance • 257
the future values of y™ and xit available in the data, and let y™ and xjt
denote the data transformation given by
where wit = V (T, - f)/(T,- - t - 1) , and T, denotes the last year of data
available (among the nonmissing observations) for observation i. Note
that in the last year of the data for observation /, the transformation is
unavailable (there are no future values for the construction of y\ and xit),
so this observation is set to missing. This transformation sets a™ to zero,
so the transformed model is
uif
If the original error term u% is homoscedastic, this transformation pre-
serves homoscedasticity, and does not induce serial correlation. This
transformation preserves instruments, because all current and lagged
values of xit remain uncorrelated with the tranformed error term:
E(*«-s"«)
 = 0 for all s ^ 0. These moment conditions suggest the use of an
efficient GMM estimator for b
m. In theory, many instruments (all lags of
xit) are potentially available in the sample. In practice, to avoid finite-
sample problems, we use only current values of xit. That is, we assume zit
= xit. Combining moment conditions for all equations, our GMM estima-
tor is based on E(uit ® zit) = 0.
This model can be expressed in matrix notation as follows. Let y
m =
{ynfj/nr • - • 9NT }' denote the stacked vector of observations on y™ for the
mth equation, stacking only observations for which y™, xit, or zit are not
missing for any m. Similarly, let Z, X, and u
m be the stacked observations
on z'it, x'it, and u™t, respectively. Then the model for the observations in the





To write the expression for the GMM estimates of the M
2Pxl vector of
slope coefficients b = {b
uf . . . ,b
M'}', stack the moments from all M
equations to form the ML X 1 vector of moment conditions £(u,,®z,7) = 0,
where uit = {u}t, . . . ,u%}'. Lety be theMN* X 1 vectory = {f, . . . ,y
w}'
formed by stacking the vectors of observations on the M equations, and
let X = IM ® X, Z = IM ® Z, and W = (Z'Z)~\ It turns out, then, that the
vector of slope coefficients b is
6 = (X'ZWZ'X)-
JX'ZWZ'i/,258 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
where W is a positive semidefinite weighting matrix. The efficient GMM
estimator is obtained by choosing W = Vj"
1, where V^ is a consistent
estimate of the asymptotic covariance of the sample moments, (1/N*)
2/^ 2[ia (uit ® zit). A convenient estimator of V is




where N* = 2^ T, is the total number of observations in the (unbalanced)
panel, T, denotes the number of nonmissing time-series observations
available for firm i, and uit is the residual estimate of the transformed error
term uit, constructed using a consistent preliminary estimate of b (two-
stage least squares). Note that it is not necessary to include auto-
covariance terms in the expression for Vv since, by assumption,
E(uitu'it_s\zit/ . . . ,zit_s) = 0 for all s > 0. Finally, a robust estimate of the asymptotic covariance of bGMM is given
by
Est Var(6GMM) = (X'ZWZ'Xj-'X'ZV^'XiX'ZWZ'X)
-l
where V^ is an estimated like Vx using estimates of the transformed
residuals derived from the GMM estimate bGUM.
A.2 ESTIMATING THE INVESTMENT EQUATION USING
GENERATED REGRESSORS BASED ON THE VAR ESTIMATES
Given the GMM estimates bCMM of a VAR system that includes a measure
of the marginal profitability of capital, MPK,f, and a financial state vari-
able FIN,(, we can use a second-stage regression to obtain structural
estimates of the parameters for the cost of adjustment and shadow dis-
count rate functions. Consistent estimates of the slope coefficients are
easily obtained using GMM. However, the use of generated regressors
implies that the usual standard error estimates are inconsistent. This
subsection reviews the details of the second-state estimator and pro-
vides standard-error estimates that are consistent in the presence of
generated regressors.
The investment model in the paper is
= a0 + a, (PV,r
K) + ^TflFV™) + f, + dt + *>,,,
where PV|f
P
K and PV™ are present-value terms that are linear in xit but
(highly) nonlinear in b. Let f(b) be an MP X 2 matrix defined so that
multiplication of xit by f(by produces a 2 X 1 vector of present-values
terms, f(b)'xit = {PV,f
K, PVj
N}'. Using the notation from the main text,Investment: Fundamentals and Finance • 259
the first column of f(b) is given by c2[I - (3A(b)]
 lbA(b)
2, and the second
column of f(b) is given by c3(l-j3)~
1 [I— f$A(b)Y
xbA(b)
2, where the notation
A(b) reflects the fact that the companion matrix A is a function of the VAR
parameters b.
Letting iit = (I/K),,, qit = f(b)'xit/ and a = {av ct2y<t>}', we can write the above investment model as
Using forward-mean differences to remove year and firm effects (as
discussed in the previous subsection), we can write the transformed
model as
ht = ^« + &,*•
For identification, we assume E{ioit\ fif yt, xit, xit_lf xit_2, - • •) = 0. This implies that the same vector of instruments zit used in the estimation of
the VAR is also valid for the estimation of the investment equation. If we
let i and Q be the matrices of stacked observations on iit and qit, respec-
tively, then a GMM estimator for a is given by
where V2 = 1/N*^,^Ij^ (a>it (x) zit)(a>it ® zit)', and where wit is the residual estimate of the transformed error term, 5)it, constructed using the first
stage estimate of a.
Recall that flGMM1 is estimated using generated regressors. Hence, the
above expression for V2 does not consistently estimate the asymptotic
covariance of the second-stage sample moments, because it fails to take
account of the implicit variation in <ait induced by b. A consistent estima-










Consistent standard-error estimates for flGMM1 are given by260 • GILCHRIST & HIMMELBERG
Est Var(flGMM1) = {X'ZV2
lZ'X)-
lX'ZV3
The availability of V3 suggests a second, potentially more efficient
GMM estimator for a, namely
Consistent standard error estimates for aCMM2 are given by
Est Var (aGMM2) = {X'ZV^Z'Xy
xX'ZV,Z'X{X'ZV^Z'X)~\
where V4 is estimated using the expression for V3, but where a>it and a are
calculated using aCMM2- The estimates reported in the main text are based
on this estimator.
A derivation of the above results is available from the authors on
request. See also Newey (1984).
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Understanding investment has always been one of the central goals of
macroeconomics. Unfortunately, the neoclassical model does not do a
very good job in describing the empirical investment behavior of individ-
ual firms. This nice paper by Gilchrist and Himmelberg is part of the
large literature which invokes financial-market imperfections to better
explain microeconomic investment decisions. One of the key issues in
this area is disentangling changes in economic fundamentals from
changes in the firm's financial position. Do balance-sheet variables like
cash flow have an independent effect on investment, or are both invest-
ment and cash flow simply correlated with the firm's underlying state
variable? Improvements in economic fundamentals, such as the mar-
ginal product of capital (MPK), directly increase investment through the
standard neoclassical channel while at the same time improving the
firm's financial position. Hence, even if financial markets are perfect,
financial variables will be correlated with investment. Initially, this litera-
ture used Tobin's q to control for fundamentals and argued that financial
variables are still important in explaining investment. However, since
empirical estimates of q are most likely highly mismeasured, variables
like cash flow may still be capturing the effects of fundamentals on
investment rather than imperfect financial markets.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg attempt to solve this problem by obtaining a
better measure of economic fundamentals. Instead of using average q,
the authors show that for a certain set of production functions, the sales-
to-capital ratio will be proportional to the firm's MPK. They then useComment • 263
their preferred measure of economic fundamentals in two specifications.
First, they run panel data VARs in I/K, MPK, and CF/K to argue that
orthogonal shocks to cash flow matter even after controlling for the
marginal product of capital. Second, they linearize a model of invest-
ment with financial-market imperfections where firms' discount rates
are parametrized as a reduced-form function of balance-sheet variables.
The model generates linear regressions similar to the ones used in the
earlier financial-market imperfections literature:
Y = & + /31EPDV(MPK) + /32EPDV(FIN)
where EPDV denotes the expected present discounted value and FIN is
a financial indicator. In this specification, following Abel and Blanchard
(1986), economic fundamentals as measured by marginal q are deter-
mined by forecasting expected future values of the MPK. Since the fore-
casts of MPK and the financial variables are based on lags of investment,
MPK, and financial variables, this specification is similar to the previous
VAR regressions except that the dynamic structure has been constrained
by theory.
The results from both specifications are quite nice. The financial vari-
ables are significant for small firms and firms without bond ratings, even
controlling for fundamentals. Economic fundamentals also are signifi-
cant, and unlike results using average q, they are economically impor-
tant. This is an important achievement which should give more confi-
dence in these types of specifications. However, I will argue that the
improved performance of the authors' measure of fundamentals should
not be surprising and may not be capturing what we originally expected.
The key issue in this paper is appropriately measuring economic fun-
damentals. Otherwise, the authors could have continued to use average
q with stock-market data like most of the literature. What exactly are
economic fundamentals? Under the null hypothesis with no financial-
market imperfections, economic fundamentals represent the state vari-
able of the firm's investment problem. Gilchrist and Himmelberg follow
the financial-market-imperfection literature by arguing that this theoreti-
cal state variable is marginal q or EPDV(MPK). Note, however, that
marginal q is the correct state variable only in problems with quadratic
(or some other convex) adjustment costs. There is a growing empirical
literature which argues that quadratic adjustment costs are a poor as-
sumption for investment at the microeconomic level. Instead, at the
level of the firm or plant, investments are intermittent and lumpy, consis-
tent with nonconvex adjustment cost functions such as fixed costs of
investment. Caballero and Leahy (1996) show that with nonconvex ad-264 • GROSS
justment costs, marginal q is not the appropriate state variable for the
firm's problem. In fact, average q is more correlated than marginal q with
investment. If marginal q is not the firm's true state variable, then finan-
cial variables could be statistically significant in the data, without any
financial-market imperfections.
Even if marginal q as measured using the expected future MPK is the
correct state variable, there are several difficulties. The authors measure
the MPK as
MPK =e( ^^ )
where the constant of proportionality
v-
1 ^ v )<xk in(jUstry average (sales/K)
is allowed to vary across industries. These identifying assumptions for 6,
while true for Cobb-Douglas production functions with a constant elas-
ticity demand curve, are very strong and likely to introduce measure-
ment error just as in the original criticism leveled at average q. For
example, there is no reason to believe that 6 is constant over time and
within an industry. In addition, to solve for 0 for an industry, it is as-
sumed that the average marginal product of capital within the industry
is just the user cost, r+8. However, this is not true in general for most
specifications of adjustment costs. It is also not true if there are financial-
market imperfections, since constrained firms will act as if they faced a
higher discount rate than the market rate for unconstrained firms. While
the high discount rate is not a problem under the null hypothesis, the
authors use this measure of fundamentals to interpret their linearized
model of financial imperfections.
The most problematic issue with the construction of fundamentals in
this paper is the interpretation of a quantity-based measure such as sales
rather than a forward-looking asset price such as stock returns or interest
rates. It is well known that including almost any firm-level quantity
variable has strong predictive power in investment regressions, while
including variables related to the user cost does not work as well. By
adding a quantity-based measure such as sales, are we really capturing
the expected marginal return on investment, or are we capturing accel-
erator effects? This question is similar to an earlier debate in the invest-
ment literature in which strong interest-rate elasticities for investment
were found by substituting output for the interest rate in the firm's first-
order condition for investment. These results were not robust to using
interest rates directly.Comment • 265
It is certainly possible that quantity measures, such as sales, have less
measurement error than price measures, such as average q or the user
cost, for measuring economic fundamentals. The problem with arguing
that the marginal product of capital is proportional to sales is one of
interpretation. How do you separate the effects of fundamentals from
financial explanations when financial-market imperfections are the main
story behind accelerator models? Models with financial-market imperfec-
tions predict that the average product of capital (APK) or other measures
of profits should be important for investment in addition to the marginal
product. Even in the authors' model, the APK and the MPK will be
highly correlated:
APK=02(^O-|;
Similarly, it is difficult to separate the partial effects of sales and cash
flow in the regression
Since profits or cash flow is equal to sales minus costs, do we really
believe that shocks to sales capture economic fundamentals while shocks
to costs are only related to financial effects? The authors argue that there
is some variation in cash flow which is not related to fundamentals.
However, there is also some variation in cash flow which is related to
fundamentals, and in sales which is related to the firm's financial condi-
tion. As a result, I think of both sales and cash flow as noisy estimates of
both fundamentals and financial effects.
Even though it may be difficult to separate fundamentals from finan-
cial effects through direct measurement, there is still a lot of potential in
this approach. In particular, I encourage the authors to follow the meth-
odology used in their previous paper, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Rather than trying to distinguish the MPK from cash flow, the authors
focused on the strength of this method—dynamics. Using the same
variable for both fundamentals and financial effects, it is possible to test
for financial effects by looking at whether investment has excess sensitiv-
ity to current variables:
— = ft + a FPDV I ^^ I + fi ^=±-
•^ \ K J K
Does current cash flow or, even better, the stock of cash predict invest-
ment even after controlling for the EPDV of future profits?266 • WEST
In future work, adding more structure to the alternative model of
financial-market imperfections should yield differential predictions to
help test the validity of financial explanations for investment. In my past
work, for example, I showed (Gross, 1997) that imposing liquidity con-
straints leads to strong nonlinearities in the predicted effects of financial
variables, which are confirmed in the data. It would be even more useful
to explicitly model the information or agency problem which generated
the financial-market imperfection in the first place. It may be too much
to ask for an empirically tractable, theoretically justified model of
financial-market imperfections which allows for nonconvex adjustment
costs and can deal with the heterogeneity present in real-world data.
However, it will be difficult to fully understand the microeconomics of
investment without such a model.
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In this stimulating paper, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (hereafter, GH) use
Compustat data to test and quantify the effect of financial factors on
investment. I like the paper's innovative willingness to estimate and test
a structural model with financial frictions. In my view, this is a welcome
advance on a common practice of estimating a model without such fric-
tions and testing whether the model fails in ways consistent with finan-
cial frictions. By specifying precisely and completely how financial fric-
tions affect investment, GH can quantify the effects of those frictions,
I thank the National Science Foundation and the Graduate School of the University of
Wisconsin for financial support, and John Jones for helpful comments and discussions.Comment • 267
and get a sense for whether still richer models are required to adequately
explain investment.
I divide my comments into two parts. First is a summary of the litera-
ture on borrowing constraints and investment. Then follows a discus-
sion of the structural model (Sections 3-5 in GH). I conclude that the
present paper leaves some important questions unanswered. While I am
receptive to GH's interpretation, in the end I do not find it compelling.
2. Borrowing Constraints and Investment
In typical parametrizations of the models of Hall and Jorgenson (1967)
and Tobin (1969), investment is determined by the ratio of output to the
cost of capital or by stock-market-based measures of Tobin's Q, perhaps
along with lags of these variables or of investment itself. For want of a
better term, I will refer to such variables as the traditional determinants of
investment. At least since Meyer and Kuh (1957), however, it has been
recognized that cash flow is a good predictor of aggregate investment.
Clark (1979) concluded that cash flow and output together predict better
than do the neoclassical determinants, a finding broadly consistent with
the somewhat weaker role for cash flow found in the more recent study
by Kopcke (1993).
In a pioneering paper, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) estab-
lished a complementary set of results with individual firm data. They ran
investment regressions in which right-hand-side variables included
some traditional determinants of investment as well as cash flow. They
found that cash flow had a statistically significant effect on investment
for firms that one might expect to be financially constrained, namely,
ones with low dividend payouts. As documented in Hubbard's (1998)
survey, many subsequent studies have found that measures of liquidity,
such as cash flow or debt, are statistically significant predictors of invest-
ment for firms displaying low dividends, no bond rating, or some other
presumed signals of financial illiquidity. While a literature has risen in
reaction, arguing that in one or another dataset the empirical evidence in
fact does not suggest that financial factors are important (e.g., Hayashi,
1997; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner, 1998),
it is my judgment that there now exists a strong case that financial
variables have information about investment not contained in the tradi-
tional measures.
The predictive power of cash flow suggests a difference between inter-
nal and external costs of funds. Indeed, it has been shown formally that268 • WEST
in the presence of informational frictions, such as imperfect or costly
monitoring of a firm's behavior by a lender (Townsend, 1979; Myers and
Majluf, 1984), the shadow value of internal funds will be larger than that
of external funds, at least some of the time. Cash flow will therefore likely
affect investment, even after controlling for traditional determinants.
In my opinion, however, the empirical literature has not made a good
case that informational frictions in fact rationalize the empirical impor-
tance of financial variables.
1 It is well recognized that misspecification of
the parametric form of the traditional model, or inappropriate account-
ing for unobservable disturbances or for the informational role of finan-
cial variables, could cause spurious significance of financial variables,
significance that would disappear if the frictionless model were appropri-
ately specified.
Support for the view that financial frictions rather than misspecifi-
cation are key could come from establishing that the estimates on finan-
cial factors fall in a tight range predicted by an underlying theoretical
model, that a model with financial frictions does not reject tests of over-
identifying restrictions, that no variables beyond those posited by the
model have substantial explanatory power for investment, and so on. To
my knowledge, little research in this literature attempts to do so. In-
stead, the bulk of the literature that I am familiar with evaluates (and
usually rejects) a null neoclassical model. No doubt this is in large part
because quantitatively tractable models of financial frictions are difficult
to come by. Nonetheless, this approach yields diminishing returns for
people who, like me, are already persuaded that cash flow and other
financial variables help predict the investment of firms that display signs
of illiquidity.
I therefore am very receptive to Gilchrist and Himmelberg's effort to
formulate and evaluate a model with financial frictions.
3. Gilchrist and Himmelberg's Model
Sections 3-5 of GH specify, estimate, and test a model of investment in
the presence of financial frictions—that is, the null model is one with
financial frictions (though a frictionless model is nested within the null
model).
Specifically, this part of GH:
1. Nor, even assuming that these frictions in fact do account for the econometric results,
does this or related literature establish that the frictions have nontrivial effects on aggre-
gate output, although it has been shown that such frictions potentially have aggregate
effects (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Jones, 1998). But further
discussion of that point will take us pretty far from the GH paper.Comment • 269
1. Constructs a present value called fundamental Q—a specific example
of what I called a "traditional" measure above—by positing a para-
metric functional form, linearizing, and using data on output, capital,
and other variables, as in Abel and Blanchard (1986). Fundamentals
depend only on the marginal profit of capital (MPK) and, in contrast
to Abel and Blanchard (1986) and many other papers, not on discount
factors (i.e., not on user costs of capital), which are assumed not to
vary.
2. Approximates the effects of financial frictions by (i) showing that
these will manifest themselves in time-varying discount factors; (ii)
linearizing to separate the discount factor from the frictionless funda-
mentals; (iii) assuming the linearized term is also linear in observable
financial data, namely, cash and equivalents, or working capital less
long-term debt.
3. Regresses investment on lagged investment, fundamental Q, and the
present value of financial frictions (financial Q). The finding is that
financial frictions are both statistically and economically important.
As a mechanical matter, the regressions are novel essentially in enter-
ing the financial variable in a constrained form, as a present value; the
common procedure in this literature is simply to add a variable like cash
and equivalents to whatever variables are included by virtue of the tradi-
tional model under examination. The important novelty is a willingness
to maintain, at least tentatively, that the addition of the financial variable
results in a complete model for investment. GH acknowledge that the
model in fact does miss an important aspect of investment behavior, in
that the data want lagged investment on the right-hand side (Section
5.3), and they make rationalizing this extra term a high priority for future
research. But they also clearly feel that the present specification docu-
ments strong economic and statistical effects from financial frictions.
While I do find GH's results suggestive, I am not as convinced as are
GH that they have documented strong effects. In explaining this view-
point, I will not promote an alternative interpretation of their results,
still less provide a different point estimate of the quantitative effects of
financial frictions. Rather, I want to raise some questions, which, until
answered, suggest caution in interpreting GH's findings. These ques-
tions include:
1. In their theoretical development, GH assume that in the absence of
financial frictions the discount rate is constant across firms and time
(Section 3.1); had they carried through the algebra with time-varying
discount rates, there would have been an additional term, involving270 • WEST
the present value of future values of discount rates (see Abel and
Blanchard, 1986). The presence of time dummies in the empirical
work implicitly allows time variation in discount rates that is common
to all firms; the presence of a fixed effect means one can interpret
such variation as occurring around a firm-specific mean discount rate.
(That is, these dummies allow for time variation in discount rates that
is perfectly correlated across firms, with each firm possibly having a
different mean discount rate.) But firm-specific variation (i.e., imper-
fect correlation across firms) is swept into the regression disturbance.
And we have a raft of finance studies indicating that discount rates
vary across firms. Such variation may affect the estimates on the
coefficients on the two present values included by GH. If the varia-
tion is largely uncorrelated with the GH present values (perhaps this
is the case for most firms presumed to be financially unconstrained in
Tables 5 and 6), the GH interpretation is still legitimate. But if the
variation is correlated with the included present values (perhaps
firms that are financially constrained undertake riskier projects),
omitted-variable bias will invalidate the GH procedure. So: how are
the estimates and interpretation affected by cross-sectional variation
in discount factors stemming from traditional forces (rather than from
financial frictions)?
2. When lagged investment is added to the GH equation, the term
proves significant, but, the authors tell us, the point estimates on the
two present values change little. It is, however, premature to con-
clude, as the authors seem to, that once the model is expanded to
formally allow for lagged investment, the statistical or economic im-
portance of the two present values will change little. This is because
in the expanded model the present values will be calculated in a
different way, implying that the present model's regressions contain
noisy measures of the relevant objects. If one rationalizes the lag with
costs of adjustment or serially correlated shocks, the relevant regres-
sion will involve a lag of investment and two present values, and the
two present values will be different from the ones presently included.
(For example, with costs of adjustment, a certain quadratic will be
factored, with forward solution of the unstable root to this quadratic
affecting the present value calculation.) If, instead (or in addition),
one rationalizes the lag with an information role for investment—that
is, the firm forecasts the present values using data not available to the
econometrician—the regression will still involve only two present
values, but once again the two will be different from the ones pres-
ently included (see Kiyotaki and West, 1996). So: what happens whenComment • 271
the model is extended to rationalize the predictive power of lagged
investment?
3. GH state that their linearization implies that the external finance
premium is proportional to their measure of financial liquidity (either
cash and equivalents, or working capital less long-term debt), with a
factor of proportionality </>. They also conclude that the regression
estimate of </> is pretty much consistent with a back-of-the-envelope
calculation. I could not quite follow the details of this calibration, so I
will not comment except to state such a check on the reasonableness
of the estimate is an important one. An additional check is suggested
by the model's implication that one can read interest-rate spreads off
the measure of financial liquidity. If one backs out a series of spreads
(presumably identified only up to the addition of a constant), what
does the series look like, and how does it compare to observed data
on lending rates?
I look forward to the answers to questions such as these in the next
paper in the Gilchrist Himmelberg's research program.
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Discussion
Much of the discussion focused on the adequacy of the baseline model,
particularly the use of the sales-to-capital ratio as a measure of the mar-
ginal profitability of fixed capital. Janice Eberly pointed out that the
proportionality of profitability and sales requires that variable factors,
such as labor, be adjustable instantaneously. If there are costs of adjust-
ing labor, then shocks to wages (for example) will affect profitability and
cash flow without having a short-run effect on output. On a related
issue, Fabio Schiantarelli noted that, if there are costs of adjusting the
capital stock, the net marginal profitability of capital depends on the
investment-to-capital ratio as well as sales. Jason Cummins asked about
the omission of inventories from the analysis. Charles Himmelberg re-
plied to Cummins that, possibly because of the use of annual data, it
makes little difference empirically whether inventories are included, that
is, either sales or production can be used as the measure of profitability.
More generally, Himmelberg defended the baseline model by pointing
out that it seems to work well empirically for bond-rated firms, which
are less likely to be financially constrained. Deviations from the baseline
model are thus reasonably interpreted as arising from financial factors.
A second issue was the possible effects of unmodeled heterogeneity
among firms. Cummins suggested that the restriction that the data-
generating process for shocks is identical across firms is unrealistic. He
noted that financial analysts produce earnings forecasts using firm-
specific models. He reported that, in his own work with coauthors, the
use of firm-specific earnings expectations reduced the measured effect of
cash-flow variables significantly. Himmelberg disputed the result thatDiscussion • 273
earnings expectations measures "drive out" cash-flow variables from
investment equations, indicating that this was not the case for the specifi-
cations used in the present paper. He also argued that earnings expecta-
tions might be interpreted as projections of whether the firm can repay
its debt, that is, as an indicator of financial condition, rather than as
forecasts of long-term profitability. Also on the theme of heterogeneity,
Benjamin Friedman proposed that investment-cash-flow relationships
might be quite different at the firm level than at the industry level. For
example, a firm might be impelled to invest by an increase in competi-
tive pressure, resulting in a negative relationship of current cash flow
and future investment for the firm, even though that relationship might
well be positive for the industry as a whole.
Econometric issues also received some discussion. Stephen Oliner pro-
posed the use of a larger set of instruments to reduce problems of
endogeneity.